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I.

INTRODUCTION

It may be an overstatement to say that the American credit

economy is based upon the triad of the holder-in-due-course, the
parol evidence rule, and the time-price doctrine.' However, for con-

sumers seeking to avoid paying for shoddy merchandise pursuant to
installment sales contracts which provide for burdensome "carrying

charges," the statement is not far from the truth. These bulwarks of a
creditor-oriented economy have contributed more to consumer

frustration, anger, and oppression than perhaps any other common
law doctrines. Thus it is not surprising that these concepts have
recently come under an accelerating assault. The time-price doctrine,

a creature of the common law, is being eroded in a common law
setting. 2 Primarily defined by statute, 3 the status of the holder-in-due* Professor of Law, Georgetown University. B.S. 1957, Washington University; J.D. 1961,
University of Chicago. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Marc Dorfman, a
graduate of the University of Wisconsin Law School, whose research and suggestions
contributed substantially to this article.
1.The "time-price doctrine" generally provides that usury laws will not be applied to sales
transactions in which the seller quotes one net price for cash sales and another net price for credit
sales. See generally Shanks, PracticalProblems in the Application of A rchaic Usury Statutes,
53 VA.L. REv. 327 (1967); Comment, CreditSales at a Pricein Excess of the Cash Sale Priceas
a Violation of the Usury Law, 39 YALE L.J. 408 (1930).

2. Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601,249 S.W.2d 973 (1952); Lloyd v.
Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963); Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in
Retail Installment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839, 840-51 (1953); Consumer Credit Symposium, 55

Nw. U.L. REv. 301 (1960). Perhaps the most outspoken criticism of the time-price doctrine
appears in R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS, & J. WHITE. TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 232 (1969):

Although a trend may be developing against the time price doctrine, a great majority of
the states still accept it. Thus in most states if Consumer purchased two TV's, one by
agreeing to pay seller a $400 time price for a $200 TV over 24 months and the other by
borrowing $200 from a bank for a 24-month period and agreeing to pay $200 of interest
on the loan, the former transaction would not violate the usury statute but the latter
would. Of course these transactions are functionally identical and the distinctions
between them which courts have ostensibly relied on ("People must borrow, but they
don't have to buy on time. . . .") are so much hogwash. . . .This apparently

thoughtlessjudicial affection for form may reflect ajudicial conclusion that lending at a
rate greater than the permissible usury rate is necessary and useful.
3. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-302 & 3-305 [hereinafter cited as UCC]; UNIFORM
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 52.
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course has been whittled away, at least in the context of the sale of
consumer paper, by both the common law courts4 and the
legislatures. 5 The parol evidence rule, also an invention of the
common law, has now been codified, at least with respect to
"transactions in goods," ' by section 2-202 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 7 This article, intended to show that codification
has done more to break down the severity of the common law rule
than has been realized by either the commentators or the courts, will
examine the codification in the context in which the common law
parol evidence rule seems to have done the most harm: the typical
consumer transaction.
Such a transaction generally follows this pattern: C enters the
local appliance store to purchase a color television set. In addition to
an effusive description of how the set will perform and what services
the seller will provide for the buyer, the salesman makes numerous
oral "warranties": "This set is guaranteed against defects for one
year; if anything goes wrong, we'll either replace the set or fix it for
free"; "This is a brand-new set, never been used"; "This is a wellknown brand; we had to remove the name from this set because of the
low price-fair trade laws, you know." Thoroughly persuaded, C
purchases the set, signing the omnipresent installment sales contract
and detachable negotiable promissory note. The former provides that
no warranties, express or implied, have been made other than those
that appear in the writing-the "tisclaimer" clause-and that the
entire agreement of the parties is contained in the contract, and no
4. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766,214
P.2d 819 (1950); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J.
101,232 A.2d 405 (1967). See generally Jones, FinanceCompanies as Holdersin Due Courseof
Consumer Paper, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 177; Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer
Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48, 65-77 (1966); Comment,
Judicialand Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a "Holder in Due Course" in Consumer
Transactions, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 90 (1969); Comment, Unico v. Owen: Consumer
FinanceCompanies as Holdersin Due Course Under the UCC, 54 VA. L. REv. 279 (1968).

5. Section 2.403 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, already enacted into law in
Oklahoma, OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-403 (Supp. 1969), and Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 70B-2-403 (Supp. 1969), provides:
In a consumer credit sale. . . the seller. . . may not take a negotiable instrument other

than a check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer .... A holder is not in good faith
if he takes a negotiable instrument with notice that it is issued in violation of this
section ....
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.403.
6. "Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article [2] applies to transactions in goods
. . " UCC § 2-102.
7. Id. § 2-202.
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other agreements, warranties or representations exist-the
"integration" clause. The salesman may tell C that the contract
contains all the terms of the agreement, including the representations
and warranties alluded to earlier. Shortly thereafter, the TV set
breaks down, and C, trying to get the seller to live up to his
"warranties," finds himself in an-irremediable situation. The paper
has usually been sold to a finance company which immediately takes
refuge in the bastion of holder-in-due-courseship. If the paper has not
been sold, and the seller sues for nonpayment, C's defense or
counterclaim for breach of contract is hampered by the parol evidence
rule when he attempts to introduce evidence of the representations and
warranties of the salesman. Either way, C winds up with a judgment
against him for the balance of the purchase price of the worthless
appliance.
This type of situation has inspired the common law courts' recent
trend away from consumer hardship toward help for the victimized
buyer. Their decisions have often deprived the finance companies of
their "holder in due course" shield and subjected the companies to
defenses and set-offs claimed by the buyer." Thus the importance of
the changes made in the parol evidence rule by section 2-202 is
magnified: not only may defenses be asserted against the seller who
carries or has repurchased his own paper; in many cases they may now
be asserted against the suing finance company itself. However,
winning this first battle against the finance company will be of little
use to the consumer if he then founders upon the rocks of the parol
evidence rule. Applied with its common law rigor, that rule will
prevent the consumer from introducing evidence regarding the
conversations preceding the signing of the contract which he thought
formed a part of his contract and which supply the foundation for his
defenses, counterclaims, and set-offs.
II.

THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND THE COMMON LAW

In establishing the frame of reference in which the Uniform
Commercial Code's treatment of the parol evidence rule will be
discussed, the following three statements of the rule as it purportedly
exists at the common law merit consideration:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to
which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that
contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings
8. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
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and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or
contradicting the writing.?
When a jural act is embodied in a single memorial, all other utterances of the
parties on that topic are legally immaterial for the purpose of determining what
are the terms of their act.10
[The parol evidence] rule requires, in the absence of fraud, duress, mutual
mistake, or something of the kind, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence, oral or
written, where the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated
writing."

Obviously these statements of the rule which purport to articulate the

same principle vary rather radically.' 2 Since even these leading
academic commentators cannot agree about what the rule is, what it
purports to exclude, and what evidence may be admitted despite its

restrictions, the inconsistencies which appear in the cases are not
surprising. As usually applied by the courts, the rule excludes all parol

evidence when it is determined that the writing is a "complete
integration of the parties' agreement;"' 3 if the writing constitutes only
a "partial" integration, the rule precludes the introduction of
evidence which will contradict in some respect those terms of the
parties' agreement which have been reduced to writing .

This article will not discuss at length the common law rule 5 or the
9. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573 (1960) [hereinafter cited as COIulN].
10. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2425 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGmORa] (emphasis
deleted froni original).
11.4 S.WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS § 631 (3d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
12. The other widely quoted statement of the parol evidence rule is that of the RESTA'EMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1932):
[T]he integration of an agreement makes inoperative to add to or vary the agreement all

contemporaneous oral agreements relating to the same subject-matter, and also, unless
the integration is void, or voidable and avoided, all prior oral or written agreements

relating thereto.
Extensive criticism of the Restatement treatment of the parol evidence rule appears in 3
CORBIN § 581 and Sweet, ContractMaking andParolEvidence: Diagnosisand Treatment of a
Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1968).

13. What constitutes a "complete integration" is, of course, a matter of some dispute. One
often-used standard has been called the "four-corners" test-"the court will look only within
the four comers of the document to determine whether it constitutes a complete expression of the
parties' agreement. . . :'Note, The ParolEvidence Rule: Is ItNecessary?, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV.
972, 973-74 (1969). Another test is whether "an alleged collateral agreement might 'naturally
and normally' have been made as separate agreement." Id. at 974. Compare 3 CORBIN § 582;
Sweet, supra note 12, at 1037-38. See also United States v. Clementon Sewerage Authority, 365
F.2d 609 (3d Cir. 1966), which holds that the parol evidence rule is not applicable when the very
issue to be determined is whether the writing constitutes an integration. Accord, Atlantic N.
Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293,96 A.2d 652 (1953).
14. See generally44 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 13, at 973-76.

15. Since numerous commentators have traced the development of the rule, an attempt to do
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development of the numerous exceptions to the rule which are outlined
briefly below. A detailed discussion of the effect of section 2-202 on

the rule and its exceptions is reserved for subsequent portions of this
paper.
Several important exceptions merit brief mention. First, if the
court finds that.the parties did not intend the writing to be a final
integration of the terms of their contract, parol evidence which tends

to prove consistent additional terms is admissible. 6 Second, parol
evidence may be admitted to show that no valid agreement was

made."7 Permitting introduction of testimony relating to such matters
as fraud, mistake, or duress, 8 this exception may also permit proof of
oral conditions precedent to the effectiveness of the writing qua
contract." Third, the parol evidence rule permits the showing of

failure of consideration. 0 Fourth, parol evidence is generally
admissible to interpret or explain a writing, although some courts
maintain that such evidence may be admitted only if the writing is

ambiguous and does not have a clear meaning "on its face."12' Finally,
the rule only applies to evidence of prior or contemporaneous

negotiations which precede the writing and has no effect upon
agreements made subsequent to the writing.2 2 While other less

important exceptions have developed over the years, those listed above
are the most relevant to the consumer situation which constitutes the
focus of this paper; subsequent discussions will be limited to exploring
the Code's provisions vis-a-vis these exceptions.
so here would be extremely redundant, especially when the article focuses upon section 2-202.
For general discussions of the parol evidence rule at the common law, see 3 CoRBN § 573 et
seq.; 9 WIGooRE § 2425 et seq-,4 WILLISTON §§ 631-47; Calamari & Perillo, A Plea Fora
Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. L.J. 333

(1967). See also Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d 114, 119
(3d Cir. 1966):
Where parties, without any fraud or mistake, have deliberately put their engagements in
writing, the law declares the writing to be not only the best, but the only evidence of their
agreement: . . .all preliminary negotiations, conversations and verbal agreements are
merged in and superseded by the subsequent written contract . . .and unless fraud.
accident, or mistake be averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between the
parties, and its terms cannot be added to nor subtractedfrom by parol evidence.
(emphasis in original).
16. 3CORBIN § 581;9 WIGMOPE § 2430; 4WILLISTON § 636.
17. 3 CORBIN § 577; 4 WILLIsTON § 634.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Part IV (b)-(d) infra.
See Part IV (a) infra.
3CORBIN § 586; 4 WILLISTON
3CoRBIN

3CORIN

§ 632, at 978-82.

§ 579;4WILLISTON § 631,at973-74.
§ 574; cf. UCC § 2-209(1).
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THE HISTORY OF SECTION 2-202

In the May, 1949 draft of the Code, section 2-202 provided:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree
or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of
performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms agreed upon.?

Nearly echoing this provision, the present 1962 official draft's only
variation is the substitution of the words "of the agreement" for the
words "agreed upon" at the end of subsection 2-202(b). This change
was suggested by the New York Law Revision Commission "to make
A
it clear that the provision is not limited to express terms."'
The significance of this change must be evaluated on the basis of
an understanding of the definition of "agreement." The 1949 Code
defined the term as "the bargain in fact as found in the language of
the parties or in course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance or by implication from other circumstances." In 1956
this section was amended to its present form which provides that:
"[Aigreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this Act
(Sections 1-205 and 2-208). Whether an agreement has legal consequences is
determined by the provisions of this Act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of
contracts (Section 1-103) . . .2

In describing the reasons for the changes, the editorial board merely
notes that they "leave the effect of course of dealing and the like to
other provisions such as section 1-205."21 The ensuing discussion will
show that the matter is not quite that simple.
In suggesting the above changes, the New York Law Revision
Commission was apparently concerned with the potential problems
created by a combined reading of sections 1-201(2) and 2-202 of the
23. UCC § 2-202 (May, 1949 Draft).

24.

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,

1956

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR

26 [hereinafter cited as 1956
25. UCC § 1-201(2) (May, 1949 Draft).
26. UCC § 1-201(3).

THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

27. 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS 13.

RECOMMENDATIONS].
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May, 1949 draft. While section 1-201(2) made it quite clear that an
"agreement," the "bargain [of the parties] in fact," consisted of both
express and implied terms, section 2-202-in using the phrase "terms
agreed upon"-may have been interpreted to include only express
terms. Thus the "agreement" of the parties would have been
2'
something more than the terms -which they had "agreed upon."
Given that interpretation, a party seeking admission of parol evidence
could not introduce additional terms consistent with the express terms
of the parties' bargain in fact; he might, however, argue with some
merit that he could introduce evidence of additional terms consistent
with the implied terms of the bargain in fact even if the writing were
the "complete and exclusive statement of the terms agreed upon."
Consider, for example, the well-known case of the exclusive sales
agency.2' In return for one half of the profits and revenues resulting
from Wood's efforts, Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, a "creator of
fashions," gave Wood the exclusive right to place her indorsements on
the designs of others, to place Lucy's own designs on sale, and to
license others to market her designs.30 When Lucy permitted others to
use her indorsements, Wood filed suit, claiming breach of contract.
The court rejected Lucy's contention that the writing lacked the
"elements of a contract," reasoning that while Wood "does not
promise in so many words that he will use reasonable efforts to place
the defendant's indorsements and market her designs . . . [s]uch a
promise is fairly to be implied."3 1
28. In fact, the New York Law Revision Commission suggested the following revised text
for section 2-202:

1. The terms of a contract for sale as set forth in a writing or writings intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms cannot be
contradicted by evidence of any other prior or contemporaneous oral or written
agreement between the parties. Such final expression may be explained or supplemented

by proof of an agreement upon consistent additional terms unless the court finds that
such writing or writings constitute a complete and exclusive statement of all of the terms
of such agreement. If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would, as

the court finds, ordinarily have been included in the writing or writings, then evidence of
such additional terms shall be excluded.

2. Any such final expression may be construed in accordance with Sections 1-205, 2204, subsection (3) and 2-208. This section does not displace the law of reformation of
transactions (Section 1-103). NEw YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, 1956 REPORT
RELATING TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 368 [hereinafter cited as N.Y. 1956
REPORT].
The draftsmen of the Code accepted this suggested revision of section 2-202, finding it sufficient
to change the last two words of the section.
29. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
30. Id. at90, 118 N.E. at 214.
31. Id. at 90-91, 118 N.E. at 214.
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Suppose, in the present context, that Lucy defends by alleging that

Wood has breached his implied promise to use reasonable efforts to
bring about maximum profits and revenues under the written
contract. To show the breach, she attempts to adduce evidence that

the parties had orally agreed, during the course of their negotiations,
that Wood would advertise her products in the New York Times but
had instead advertised in a different New York paper which reached a

totally different market and probably resulted in substantially lower
sales. Under the 1949 formulation of section 2-202, such evidence

might have been admitted: although the writing was intended by the
parties as the complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the

"agreement"-the "express" terms-section 2-202(b) did not
operate to prohibit evidence of terms which were consistent with the
implied terms of the parties' bargain in fact. Thus, the 1956 change
clearly intended to preclude admission of evidence of this alleged oral
2
agreement.
As already indicated, the rewording of section 1-201(3) occurred
at the same time as the changes in section 2-202.13 Addition of the

32. The Law Revision Commission may have overlooked the fact that section 1-201(2) of the
May, 1949 Draft included "Agreed" as one of the terms being defined. Thus "terms agreed
upon" may have been using the word "agreed" as there defined, eliminating the need for
remedial action by the Law Revision Commission.
33. The 1956 revisions made three significant changes in section 1-201(3): the entire section
appearing in the 1949 draft was rearranged and reconstituted as the first sentence of the amended
section; the word "Agreed" was deleted from the definition; and the second sentence was added.
Addition of the third sentence, the only substantive change, results in the admissibility of parol
evidence to show, for example, that the parties did not intend their writing to become effective
until a condition precedent not set out in the writing had occurred. For a discussion of the New
York Law Revision Commission's objections and suggested revisions to the 1949 draft of
section 1-201(3), see N.Y. 1956 REPORT 359.
The great significance of the choice of the word "agreement" for use in section 1-201(3) is
pointed out in Mooney, Old Kontract Principlesand Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the
Jurisprudenceof ourNew CommercialLaw,11 VILL. L. REv. 213 (1966):
[O]ne is struck by the enormous implications of the ostensibly insignificant insistence in
the Code on "agreement" rather than "promise." . . . Grounding contract on
agreement-in-fact, however manifested, the Code wipes out with one sweep the whole
figment of promise-for-a-promise-or-promise-for-an-act. . . . [T]he making of business
contracts should be viewed by the law as involving not only the exchange of factual
promises or the tendering of unverbalized acquiescence, but, more realistically, as the
commencement of a continuing process of agreement in the broader, more familiar sense.
. . [A] broader jurisprudential base than promised has been laid for the law of sales
. . . but a more noticeable and more important fact is that the seeming multitude of
changes in particular traditional rules of contract law gain new significance by reference
to the Code emphasis on obligation-based-on-agreement-in-fact. Id. at 227-29.
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third sentence, the only substantive change, results in the admissibility
of parol evidence to show, for example, that the parties did not intend
their writing to become effective until a condition precedent not set

out in the writing had occurred."
Strangely enough, changes in the comments to section 2-202 were
more significant than the revisions made in the section itself.
Although comments 1 and 2 have remained unchanged since the 1950
official draft, comment 3 has undergone substantial revision.,, In the
text quoted below, the italics represent additions made between 1950
and 1952, and the brackets indicate deletions:
Under paragraph (b)consistent additional terms, not reduced to writing, may
be proved unless the court finds that the writing was intended by the parties as a
complete and exclusive statement of all the terms. If the additionalterms are
such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the
document in the view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must
be kept from the trier of fact. [Before evidence of consistent additional terms
becomes inadmissible, both parties must have intended the writing to be a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms agreed upon.]
[Either a general clause excluding "all other agreements" when specifically
agreed to by both parties or the mere preparation of the agreement on a
reasonably fair form can properly be held to evidence an intention to exclude
any additional term which, although consistent with the language, is
commercially disruptive of the apparent fair intent of the bargain recorded.] 6

The deletion of the last sentence of the first paragraph of the original
comment is perhaps explainable on the ground that it merely restated
what was already set out in section 2-202(b) and was thereby excised
as redundant. However, it did go somewhat further than the section
itself in making clear that the intention specified in section 2-202(b)
must be that of both parties; speaking in the passive voice-"intended
34. This sentence recognizes the fact that an agreement may not be legally efficacious or
sufficient to constitute a "contract." See Part IV(a) infra. In the May, 1949 draft, section 1201(11) provided that "'[c]ontract' means the total obligation in law which results from the
parties' agreement as affected by this Act and any other applicable rules of law." UCC § I201(11) (May, 1949 Draft). In 1956, the definition was changed to its present form which
provides that "contract" means "the total legal obligation which results from the parties'
agreement as affected by this Act and any other applicable rules of law ..
" UCC § I201(11). The change was made "for clarification in response to criticism by the New York
Commission," 1965 RECOMMENDATIONS 13, which noted the suggestion that "the words 'total
obligation in law,' in subsection (11), are inadequate, since 'contract' as used in the Code
includes transactions of transfer, such as present sale, and since, in addition, the definition
omits any reference to 'conditions,' which may also result from the agreement." N.Y. 1956
REPORT 360.

35. Compare UCC § 2-202, Comment 3 (Proposed Final Draft 1950) with UCC § 2-202,
Comment 3 (1952 Official Draft).
36. Comment 3 now appears in a form identical to the 1952 Official Draft. See UCC § 2202, Comment 3.
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also as a complete and exclusive statement"-the section itself may
be unclear as to just whose intention it is referring to.
The second paragraph of the 1950 comment seemed to go far
beyond the specific language of the section.37 First dealing with
merger clauses, then with "reasonably fair" forms, the second
paragraph seemed to favor the person who was seeking admission of
parol evidence. If "both parties" in the typical consumer installment
sale transaction very seldom agree about anything,3 and if reasonably
fair forms are rare, the draftsmen must have intended this part of
Comment 3 to be used in a manner which would overcome the
exclusion of parol evidence in the run-of-the-mill consumer form case.
Evidence of consistent additional terms would be excluded only if the
disclaimer clause were specifically agreed to by both parties or if the
parties had signed a reasonably fair form. Furthermore, even if one or
both of these two conditions were present, only evidence of a term
which was "commercially disruptive of the apparent fair intent of the
bargain recorded" would be inadmissible. Just what this latter phrase
meant is unclear. In the typical consumer transaction, what sorts of
terms would be "commercially disruptive?" Does that phrase refer
only to dealings between merchants? How does one demonstrate the
"apparent fair intent of the bargain recorded?" Finally, whose "fair
intent" is considered-both parties to the transaction, one of the
parties, or the reasonable contract-signer?
On balance, inclusion of this paragraph of Comment 3 probably
would have been of great use to the consumer attempting to have
evidence of consistent additional terms admitted: first, because
disclaimers are seldom, if ever, agreed to by both parties; second,
because there are few "reasonably fair forms;" and finally, because
consistent additional terms usually would not be "disruptive of the
apparent fair intent of the bargain recorded." Clearly consumers
suffered a disservice by the removal of this part of the comment.
IV.
(a)

SECTION

2-202

AND THE COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS

Oral Conditions Precedent. Historically, the courts have

experienced difficulty where the defendant in a breach of contract
37. This practice is a frequent syndrome of the Code comments. See. e.g., E. FARNSWORTH,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL PAPER 6-9 (1968); R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS, & J.
WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 5 (1969). "Perhaps the

principal hazard in using the Comments ...is that they not uncommonly add to or vary the
Code language." Id. See generally Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1966 WIs. L. REv. 597.

38. See text accompanying notes 84-89 infra.

PAROL EVIDENCE: UCC 2-202

Vol. 1970:881]

action alleges that failure of an oral condition precedent precludes

effectiveness of the contract being sued on. The principal question in
this situation is whether parol evidence of the alleged condition should
be admitted.

Evidence that no contract has been formed should be admissible
on its own merits, not as an exception to the parol evidence rule. 39
Moreover, the parol evidence rule is not applicable at common law
until the court determines that complete or partial integration exists .0
The draftsmen of section 2-202 certainly did not intend to change this
result; the possibility that parol evidence would show that the parties
never intended a writing to operate as a contract until certain

conditions precedent had occurred operates outside the section 2-202
system rather than within it.
The courts, however, have displayed uncertainty concerning this
proposition. For example, in Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v.

Doliner," an action for specific performance of a stock option," the
defendant-optionors contended that an alleged oral condition
precedent to the effectiveness of the contract had not occurred,

precluding any enforceable contract. Denying the plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment, the court held that evidence of the oral

condition was admissible:
In a sense any oral provision which would prevent the ripening of the
obligations of a writing is inconsistent with the writing. But that obviously is
39. "[W]e need not begin excluding parol evidence until we know that a contract has been
made." 3 CORBIN § 577, at 385. Accord, Bommarito v. Southern Canning Co., 208 F.2d 56
(8th Cir. 1953); Haidinger-Hayes, Inc. v. Marvin Hime &Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 46, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 455 (1962); Gordy v. Ocean Park, Inc., 218 Md. 52, 145 A.2d 273 (1958).
40. 3 CORBIN § 577; Sweet, supra note 12, at 1039. Concluding that the Code makes no
attempt to define the criteria by which the courts are to determine whether a complete
integration was intended by the parties, most commentators predict that this question will
continue to be resolved by the application ofpre-Code standards. Calamari &Perillo, supra note
15, at 344-45; Comment, A n A natomy ofSections2-201 and 2-202 ofthe Uniform Commercial

Code, 4 B.C. IND. &Com. L. Rev. 381, 393 (1963). On the other hand, the New York Law
Revision Commission thought that section 2-202
insofar as it prescribes that all written memoranda or embodiments of a contract for sale
shall be deemed to bepartialintegrations unless the Court affirmatively finds the writing
to have been intended as a total integration is in conflict with an established line of New
York cases .

. .

. The chief purpose of this section is apparently to "loosen up" the

parol evidence rule ....

NEw YORK

LAw

RevISION

COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 598 (1955).

41. 26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937, rev'g 49 Misc. 2d 246, 267 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup.
Ct. 1966).
42. Although the case dealt with the sale of corporate stock, the court applied section 2-202
because it "applies to article 8, dealing with securities. . . . All parties and Special Term so
regarded it." Id. at 42 n.l, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 939 n.l.
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not the sense in which the word is used. . . .To be inconsistent the term must
contradict or negate a term of the writing. A term or condition which has a
lesser effect is provable.
.We believe the proffered evidence to be inadmissible only where the
writing contradicts the existence of the claimed additional term . . .. The
conversations in this case, some of which are not disputed, and the expectation
of all the parties for further negotiations, suggest that the alleged oral condition
precedent cannot be precluded as a matter of law or as factually impossible. It
is not sufficient that the existence of the condition is implausible. It must be
impossible .... 43

In discussing this case, two commentators conclude that, at least
with respect to oral conditions precedent, section 2-202 is more
restrictive than was the common law parol evidence rule. 4 However,
one of them fears that the effect of the opinion will be quite the
opposite of what he thought it was intended to do-that is, by
lumping proof of oral conditions precedent in with all other types of
"consistent additional terms," the opinion might be interpreted to
greatly expand the types of admissible evidence under section 2-202.46
These analyses to the contrary notwithstanding, it is clear that the

fears elicited by the Hunt Foods opinion are unfounded under any
43. Id. at 43, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 940. The Special Term apparently thought that the Code's
parol evidence rule with respect to oral conditions precedent was stricter than that of the
common law. The court acknowledged that "[a]n exception [to the parol evidence rule] is made
when the object is to prove that a writing, apparently valid and complete on its face, was not to
become effective unless and until the occurrence of an orally agreed upon condition precedent,"
thereby demonstrating that "no contract ever came into existence." However, the Special Term
reasoned, that exception was not applicable under section 2-202, at least in the case under
consideration, "since the record compels a finding that the writing sought to be implemented is
.a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.' "49 Misc. 2d 246,247,249,
267 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367, 368 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
44. Comment, Contracs-ParolEvidence--"ConsistentAdditional Terms" Within Section
2-202(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 N.Y.L.F. 520 (1966); 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1370

(1966).
45. If the court had made clear that this test [factual impossibility] was to be applied
only in the case of summary judgment, its decision would represent the proper
application of summary judgment rules to parol evidence issues. However, its opinion
. ..can be read to extend to motions for exclusion of evidence as well. General
application of an "impossibility" standard would severely impair the utility of the parol
evidence rule. When the court is faced with a motion to exclude the evidence at trial, it
must decide whether the parties in fact intended the term to be part of their final
agreement, not merely whether the existence of such an intent is possible. The court's
failure to discuss the consequences of an "impossibility" standard suggests that it did not
intend to set forth a sweeping rule. .

.

. It should not

. . .

be supposed that an

"impossibility" test has any relevance in the usual parol evidence case. 66 COLUM. L.
REv. 1370, 1376 (1966)..
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proper interpretation of section 2-202. First, even if that section is

applicable at all, the Hunt Foods court was in fact dealing with a
rather narrow legal issue: admission of evidence which would tend to
prove the existence of an oral condition precedent to the effectiveness
of the contract. 46 Second, if section 2-202 is not germane in such a
case at all, the implications of Hunt Foods are, of course,

substantially diminished.
Dealing with Hunt Foods on its own terms, one very difficult

question immediately arises: Is it really possible to say that a term or
condition which negates the existence of a contract itself can ever have

a "lesser effect" than one which contradicts or negates a single term
of the contract? In a very real sense, a parol condition precedent
contradicts the very essence of the writing-its existence as a contract.

Contradicting only one term of a writing must of necessity be a lesser
evil. Nevertheless, Hunt Foods indicates that evidence that no

contract ever existed is subject to the parol evidence rule, despite
commentators' sanguine statements to the contrary .4
In Hicks v. Bush,4" a case upon which the Hunt Foods court
placed heavy reliance, the parties entered into a contract for the
merger of their various corporate interests into a holding company.
46. The mischief inherent in the Hunt Foods treatment of oral conditions precedent
manifested itself in the more recent case of Whirlpool Corp. v. Regis Leasing Corp., 29 App.
Div. 2d 395, 288 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1968). In Whirlpool, the defendant issued a purchase order to
the plaintiff for certain equipment. In answer to the plaintiffs subsequent action for breach of
contract, the defendant alleged that prior to the issuance of the purchase order, the plaintiff had
orally agreed to supervise the installation of the equipment and perform other related tasks
before the defendant incurred any obligation to pay for the goods. Despite the fact that
Whirlpool appears to be a run-of-the-mill parol evidence case involving two parties clearly
bound by a contract (whatever its terms may in fact be), the court for some reason felt
constrained to resolve the dispute under Hunt Foods.
While generally an integrated written agreement may be shown not to have taken effect
because of an oral condition precedent, this being an exception to the parol evidence rule,
the exception does not apply where the oral condition precedent would contradict the
express terms of the writing. . . . [Tihis legal principle has been incorporated into the
statute (Uniform Commercial Code § 2-202). Id. at 397,288 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
The court then excluded the proffered evidence on two grounds: first, the evidence would
contradict the provisions of the writing relating to discount and payment; second, this sort of
term, contemplated by Comment 3 to section 2-202, would ordinarily be contained in the
writing. Although the dissent thought that the term was not contradictory to or inconsistent with
the writing, it also treated the case as one which involved a condition precedent. Id. at 399-400,
288 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
47. "The parol evidence rule is predicated upon the assumption that the parties have entered
into a valid agreement; a party is always permitted to show that no valid agreement was made."
Sweet, supra note 12, at 1039.
48. 10 N.Y.2d488, 180 N.E.2d 425,225 N.Y.S.2d 34(1962).
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Each party agreed to subscribe for a certain number of shares in the
new company, the subscriptions to be made within five days of the
agreement. In response to plaintiff's suit for specific performance, the
defendant asserted that the agreement "was not to operate" as a
contract until occurrence of an alleged parol condition-the raising of
"equity expansion funds" in excess of $650,000. The court permitted
evidence of the alleged parol condition, setting forth the following test
for determining the admissibility of such evidence:
Parol testimony is admissible to prove a condition precedent to the legal
effectiveness of a written agreement if the condition does not contradict the
express terms of the written agreement. A certain disparity is inevitable, of
course, whenever a written promise is, by oral agreement of the parties, made
conditional upon an event not expressed in the writing. Quite obviously,
though, the parol evidence rule does not bar proof of every orally established
condition precedent, but only of those which in a real sense contradict the terms
of the written agreement.49

Because the parol agreement in Hicks dealt with a matter upon which
the writing was silent, the court determined that the testimony did not
contradict the terms of the agreement and that it was, therefore,
admissible. This reasoning is, of course, pure sophistry. Evidence of
an oral condition precedent contradicts every clause in the writing, for
it is used to show that what appears on its face to be a binding
contract is in fact nothing more than a piece of paper with some
printing'on it, never intended by the parties to have legal efficacy until
some event, unspecified in the writing, has occurred. Thus, the
problem is to determine whether the language of section 2-202 will
support an argument that conditions precedent are without its ambit
of operation. °
As Professor Corbin points out, the situation presented in Hicks v.
Bush may be viewed in two ways. Either "the written instrument was
not to become a valid contract prior to the procuring of the funds, or
. . .the obligations of the parties under an irrevocable written

instrument were to be conditional on the procurement of the funds."'
If the former is found to be true, he reasons, parol evidence is always
admissible, whether it is contradictory to the writing or not. He rejects
the numerous cases which deal with the issue on the latter supposition
49. Id. at 491, 180 N.E.2d at 427,225 N.Y.S.2d at 36 (citations omitted).
50. The most common situation in which the consumer might try to prove that no contract
had ever been entered into is where the seller agrees with the buyer that their writing will not be
effective unless the buyer can obtain his own financing.
51. 3 CORBIN § 589, at 274 (Supp. 1964).
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and refuse to admit such evidence, charging that these cases are
erroneous and should "be disapproved as based upon ancient notions
as to paper writings ....-52 Acknowledging that "the actual
intention of the parties, as between the two alternatives discussed

above, may be difficult or even impossible to ascertain," he counters
that the question of intent "should be wholly immaterial if the court
can hold . . .that the oral provision is truly supplementary to the

writing and not contradictory to it."

In fact, the court in Hicks v.

Bush determined that the parties desired and intended the merger "to

be one of proposal only and that, even though the formal preliminary
steps were to be taken, the writing was not to become operative as a

contract or the merger effective until $652,500 was raised." ' By its
own view of the evidence, the court could then have taken the position

that the parol evidence rule did not apply at all, because there was in
existence no contract with which the evidence proffered could be
consistent or inconsistent. Perhaps the court is really saying that the

evidence is believable and that credibility, not admissibility, is the
crux of the case.5s

Be that as it may, some courts still fail to recognize Corbin's two
distinct interpretations-either that no contract exists at all, or that
the existing contract is subject to a condition precedent.

Consequently, these courts never reach the question of whether the
same standards of admissibility should be applied to each

interpretation. Indeed, Hunt Foods exhibits this confusion and will
hardly provide a beneficial rationale to the consumer's attorney in
52. Id. at 275.
53. Id. In analyzing a particular case, Professor Corbin suggests that
* . . we should ask the following questions: (1)Was the transaction revocable? (2) In
order to make a contract was a new expression of assent necessary? (3) I f the event, orally
stated as a condition, occurred would the agreement he enforceable despite supervening
deaths and revocations? In most of the cases. . . questions (1)and (2) would be answered
No, and question (3) would be answered Yes, showing clearly that a valid contract was
made; and yet parol evidence was admitted to prove that a party's legal duty was
conditional and its admission based upon soundjudicial instinct as to the requirements of
justice. 3 CORBIN § 589, at 545.
54. 10 N.Y.2d at 493, 180 N.E.2d at 428,225 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
55. See Note, A Critique ofthe Parol EvidenceRule in Pennsylvania, 100 U. PA. L. REv.703
(1952):
[A]II evidence will be considered, but, in order to satisfy the burden of proof imposed
upon the proponent of the oral agreement, the necessary quantum and quality of his
evidence will vary directly with the improbability of his contention. This evidence need
not be believed merely because it must be considered. Id. at 721 (emphasis omitted).
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any case in which a parol condition precedent is pleaded.

6

It is

certainly riskier to operate within the ambit of the parol evidence rule,
however confident one may be about the outcome, than to operate
outside its scope entirely where there will be no question of the
57
admissibility of the evidence.

Turning specifically to the precise language of section 2-202, it
should not be overly difficult to conclude that evidence that the parties
did not intend the writing to be legally binding should be admitted.
Section 2-202 states that "prior agreement[s]," "contemporaneous

oral agreement[s]," and "consistent additional terms" are
inadmissible, the latter terms being inadmissible only where the
writing is intended to be "a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement." Section 1-201(3) recognizes two types of

"agreements": those which have "legal consequences" and those

which do not. That section further directs us to look either to other
sections of the Code or to general contract law in order to determine
whether or not the agreement does in fact have legal consequences.

Since there are no provisions in the Code dealing with conditions
precedent to the effectiveness of an agreement, one perforce must look
to the common law of contracts, not section 2-202, to determine

whether the agreement does in fact have any legal consequences. And
since we are not then operating under section 2-202, no impediment

blocks the introduction of evidence of parol conditions precedent.
Thus, in Corbin's terms, parol evidence is admissible to show that
56. The problems raised by Hunt Foods are discussed at length in R. DUESENDERG & L.
KING. SALES & BuLK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4.0813][c], at 4135 n.73 (1969), where the authors opine that Hunt Foods
should not be taken as giving license to a court to hear evidence of any and all terms
alleged to be part of a transaction evidenced by writing. Notice that the term asserted in
that case was in addition to those set out in writing, and was in no way necessarily
contradictory to the written terms. If the asserted oral term is contradictory, and does not
fall within the exceptions to the parol evidence rule (such as contradictory course of
performance), then evidence of the term should not be admitted.
Moreover, the authors point out that the language of the opinion would make the impact of
section 2-202 "enormous, since it is difficult to conceive of any agreement to which some
additional term might not have been added and which is not necessarily inconsistent." Id. at 4138 n.74.1. A similar "Pandora's box" argument appears in note 45 supra. Such a parade of
horrible postulates is unappealing: first, because these predictions rarely come true, and, second,
because these cases deal only with one rather discrete category of contract problems.
57. Compare Gem Corrugated Box Corp. v. National Kraft Container Corp., 427 F.2d 449,
502-03 (2d Cir. 1970).
For a discussion of the general problem of counseling clients about the probable outcome of
cases involving the parol evidence rule, see Sweet, supra note 12, at 1044-45. See also Regnan,
ParolEvidence-The Utah Version, 5 UTAH L. RaV. 158, 168-69 (1956).
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"the written instrument was not to become a valid contract" prior to
the occurrence of the condition specified in the parties' extraneous
oral agreement. Crucial to this determination, of course, is the
proposition that the "agreement" mentioned in section 2-202 refers
only to agreements which have legal consequences. The history of the
section would appear to make that clear. Indeed, to hold otherwise
would be circular reasoning at its most vicious: to determine whether
or not an agreement was intended to have legal efficacy requires parol
evidence; but parol evidence will be excluded on the assumption that
all written agreements are intended to have legal efficacy. Flying in
the face of section 1-201(3), a conclusion that section 2-202 bars the
introduction of evidence which would show that the parties never
intended that their writing have legal consequences is contrary to a
substantial body of legal precedent and commentary.s'
The relationship between oral conditions precedent and the parol
evidence rule is complicated still further by the ubiquitous integration
clause. For example, in'Luther Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Johnson,9 a
contract for home improvements 6 provided that the writing
"embodies the entire understanding between the parties, and there are
no verbal agreements or representations in connection therewith."',
In plaintiff's suit to recover liquidated damages pursuant to a
covenant contained in the writing, the court permitted the defendant
to introduce evidence that the effectiveness of the contract for
improvements depended upon the defendant's ability to obtain
financing from his bank and that both parties understood that the
defendant would not become obligated under the contract until he
procured the funds. The court's own words provide an explicit
statement of the issue at hand: "[C]an it be said that the testimony
regarding the condition precedent does not contradict the writing
58. For example, in the analogous situation of interpreting an absolute deed intended as a
mortgage, parol evidence is always admitted to show that what appears on its face to be a final
conveyance of real estate was really intended as security only. Beeler v. American Trust Co., 24
Cal. 2d 1, 147 P.2d 583 (1944); Piercev. Robinson, 13 Cal. 116 (1859); Umpqua Forest Indus.v.
Neenah-Oregon Land Co., 188 Ore. 605, 217 P.2d 219 (1950); 3 CORBIN § 587, at 507; G.
OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF MORTGAGES §§ 75-78 (2d ed. 1970). While analogies to
the chancellor's fervent desire to protect the equity of redemption may be risky, one should
nevertheless realize that the consumer is increasingly becoming just as big a favorite as
mortgagors, widows, and orphans.
59. 229 A.2d 163 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
60. Since it applies only to "transactions in goods," article 2 is thus inapplicable in the
Williams case.See UCC § 2-102(1).
61. 229 A.2d at 165.
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when the contract states' there
are no agreements other than those
2
contained in the writing?"
Although the court was cognizant of a substantial body of
authority holding to the contrary,3 it answered the question in the
affirmative, concluding that the contrary decisions were founded upon
an erroneous interpretation of section 241 of the Restatement of
Contracts.

That section, the court reasoned, does not intend the

automatic exclusion of parol evidence in the presence of an integration
clause, but contemplates exclusion "only

if the alleged parol

condition contradicts some other specific term of the written
agreement. '" S Since the writing contained no reference to financing,
the defendant's testimony concerning the oral agreement did not
contradict any of the writing's terms and was admissible. The court's
opinion left unexplored the remaining area of operation of integration
clauses.
As in Hunt Foods and Hicks v. Bush, the court in Williams chose
to operate within the perimeters of the parol evidence rule, rather than
holding that the parol evidence rule has no applicability with respect
to this question. 6 The problems with this sort of reasoning are
obvious;1 however, Williams does seem to indicate that whatever the
ultimate rationale adopted by cases such as Hunt Foods which were
decided under the Code, the presence of an integration clause should
62. Id.
63. Id. at 166 (citing Rowe v. Shehyn, 192 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 196 I)); J &J Constr. Co. v.
Mayernik, 241 Ore. 537,407 P.2d 625 (1965).
64. Where parties to a writing which purports to be an integration of a contract between
them orally agree, before or contemporaneously with the making of the writing, that it
shall not become binding until a future day or until the happening of a future event, the
oral agreement is operative if there is nothing in the writing inconsistent therewith.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 241 (1932).

65. 229 A.2d at 166.
66. The presence of an integration clause, according to Professor Corbin, "does not prove
that the document itself was ever assented to or ever became operative as a contract." 3
CoaBN § 578, at 405. Compare the following:
The distinction (of § 2-202) between a parol (unintegrated) agreement which
"contradicts" one or more terms of the writing and one which is used to "explain or
supplement" its terms may be difficult to maintain in practice; and its uncertainty tends
to impair the policy of protecting the effectiveness of a written instrument. However, the
New York courts have already accepted this distinction in accepting the concept of
partial integration. Whether this concept will succumb to the usual "merger clause".
in formal sales contracts is not settled in New York, but an affirmative answer seems
likely. NEw YORK LAW REvISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
601 (1955).
67. See notes 46-49 supra a.nd accompanying text.
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not bar the result reached-the admission of parol evidence of a
condition precedent.

(b) Fraud. At common law, parol evidence is generally
8 While section 2-202 makes no direct
admissible to prove fraud.A

mention of fraud, it is doubtful that the Code has effected any changes
in this area.
In Associated HardwareSupply Co. v. Big Wheel Distributing

Co.," the plaintiff seller sued for the unpaid balance of an account.
The defendant buyer counterclaimed, alleging that his signature was

obtained by the seller's material misrepresentations which amounted
to fraud in the inducement. Rejecting the seller's contention that

section 2-202 contained no exception allowing parol evidence of fraud,
the court concluded that section 1-103 carried the common law

exception for fraud into section 2-202.71 Nothing in the Code or the
cases would appear to be contradictory to this conclusion.
(c) Misrepresentation.Although the term "misrepresentation"

is not generally found in lists of exceptions to the parol evidence rule,
evidence of material misrepresentation has been admitted

occasionally to contradict a written contract. 71 For example, in Hull7 2 an automobile dealer sought to invoke
Dobbs, Inc. v. Mallicoat,
68. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
69. 355 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1965).
70. Id. at 119. Cf. Sweet, Promissory Fraudand the ParolEvidence Rule, 49 CALIF. L. REV.
877 (1961). Some support for the proposition advanced in Associated Hardwareis presented in
Toker v. Perl, 108 N.J. Super. 129, 260 A Id 244 (App. Div. 1970), affg 103 N.J. Super. 500,
247 A2d 701 (Law Div. 1968), and Symonds v. Adler Restaurant Equip. Co., 6 UCC REP.
SERv. 808 (Okla. 1969). With respect to evidence of fraud, illegality, mistake, or accident in
general, Professor Corbin initially stated that "oral testimony is admissible to prove fraud,
illegality, accident or mistake. This is so, even though the testimony contradicts the terms of a
complete integration in writing." 3 CORBIN § 580, at 431. Professor Sweet, after reviewing the
leading California cases on promissory fraud, noted the fact that many cases refuse to admit
evidence of oral promises, despite allegations that they were made without any intention on the
part o.f the promisor to perform, "if the alleged oral promise is at variance with the writing."
Demonstrating that the RESTATEMENT OF COrRAcTs § 238 (1932). disagrees with the
California formulation, he suggested that Professor Corbin, "perhaps overenthusiastically,
denies any effect to inconsistency." Sweet, supra, at 879-80. In a later supplement to his work,
Professor Corbin acceded to this charge and acknowledged that Professor Sweet's statement
was correct. 3 CoRBIN § 580, at 228 (Supp. 1964).
71. The narrow distinction between fraud and misrepresentation of a material fact is blurred
by the courts' frequent combinination of these terms into some form such as "fraudulent
representations.' See, e.g., Wachtman v. Derran Food Plan, 71 Dauph. 121, 130 (Dauph.
County Ct., Pa. 1957) ("Misrepresentations made under the circumstances aforementioned are
fraudulent and are implied, constructive or legal fraud or fraud in equity.").
72. 57 Tenn. App. 100,415 S.W.2d 344 (1966).
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section 2-202 to exclude parol evidence of representations concerning
the condition of the car which he had sold. The writing in question,
entitled "Security Agreement," contained an integration clause and a
statement that "warranties, representations and promises" were not
to be binding on any assignee of the seller. In holding the evidence
admissible, the court stated:
Since the "agreement" and "representations, warranties and promises" are
treated as being separate and distinct and representations as to the condition of
property sold are not generally considered a part of the agreement but an
inducement to the execution of the sale agreement, we can not say the parties
intended the Security Agreement to be a final statement of the terms of the sale.
Representations as to the condition of the car are not inconsistent with any
provision of the contract even if it should be held that the Security Agreement
was intended as afinal statement of the terms of the sale.7h

The italicized portion of the quotation makes it clear that the court
was perfectly prepared to admit the evidence-contradictory though it
may have been-on section 1-103 grounds and not as an exception to
section 2-202.
The consumer's attorney in the misrepresentation situation,
therefore, may first try the avenue of fraud in order to avoid
application of section 2-202, or, failing to convince a court which is
applying a very stringent definition of fraud, he may always try to
have the court adopt a theory that evidence of false representations is
also an dxception to the Code's parol evidence rule.
(d) Mistake. Most discussions of the common law parol
evidence rule lump together fraud, accident, and mistake as generally
recognized exceptions. 74 As was true in the case of fraud, the
interpretations of section 2-202, although hardly plentiful, seem to
indicate that parol evidence of mistake will be admitted.
The case most specifically in point is General Equipment
Manufacturers v. Bible Press, Inc. 75 In that case, the defendant
entered into a contract with the Archdiocese of Detroit to install
equipment in its schools and asked plaintiff, the defendant's supplier,
to provide a quotation for the equipment involved. The plaintiff's
response stated a quotation of $32,000 which included cost, freight,
and installation charges for each item. Defendant thereupon sent a
purchase order to plaintiff for "[o]ne lot of laboratory furniture per
73. Id. at 104,415 S.W.2d at 346 (emphasis added). Accord, Culp v. Bloss, 203 Kans. 714,
457 P.2d 154 (1969) (pre-Code).
74. See, e.g., 3 CoRB N § 580; 4 WILLSTON § 634.
75. 10 Mich. App. 676, 160 N.W.2d 370 (1968).
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quote of [plaintiff] . . . ." Around the time for delivery and
installation ten or eleven months later the plaintiff sent a letter, dated
July 19, to the defendant, stating inter alia that the charges were the
amount quoted in the original order but failing to include $3,000 for
installation charges. Upon completion of the order, the Archdiocese
made payment by check payable.to plaintiff and defendant jointly.
The plaintiff ultimately remitted to defendant the difference between
the amount of the check and the amount quoted in the plaintiff s July
19 letter, resulting in an overpayment to defendant of a little over
$2,600. When defendant refused to refund that amount, this suit
'followed.
Since the trial court below was unsure whether the purchase order
or the letter of July 19 constituted the final contract of the parties, it
admitted evidence of all the negotiations between the parties and held
for the plaintiff. In affirming the admission of parol evidence to show
unilateral mistake, the appellate court found that the plaintiff should
be permitted to recover upon a theory of unjust enrichment, since the
defendant showed no detrimental reliance upon the overpayment.
While it did not specifically determine which was the "real" contract
between the parties, the appellate court clearly would have reached the
same result regardless of the final determination of this question.
Thus, parol evidence would be admissible in a case of unilateral
mistake, a conclusion which seems to be based upon section 1-103.
(e) Subsequent Agreements. Although section 2-202 limits the
admission of "evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement" to contradict the terms of a
written agreement,7 6 the section does not prevent proof of an
agreement made after the writing was entered into, even if the new
agreement contradicts or varies the terms of the previous agreement.
The parol evidence rule was not designed to prevent the introduction
7
of evidence showing that the parties have changed their minds.1
This "exception" to the parol evidence rule can be a valuable tool
to the consumer's lawyer. If, for example, the client contacts his
lawyer soon enough after the transaction, it may be possible to
"create" evidence which no rule purports to render inadmissible. If
the client returns to the seller, accompanied by witnesses, and
76. UCC § 2-202.
77. Section 2-209(1) carries this principle further by providing that "[a]n agreement
modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding." UCC § 2-

209(l).
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complains about his purchase, the seller may seek to pacify the client
by making additional express warranties or other promises. These

new warranties may easily be considered part of the "basis of the
bargain" identified in section 2-313, 78 because they are intended by

the seller to make the buyer content with his merchandise. Comment 7
to section 2-313 strenghtens this conclusion:
The precise time when the words of description or affirmation are made. . . is
not material. The sole question is whether the language . . .[is] fairly to be
regarded as part of the contract. If language is used after the closing of the deal
. . .the warranty becomes a modification. ....
7.

The seller, on the other hand, may feel that he is completely

protected and need not pacify his customer. In this case he may make
some damaging admission about the goods along with his summary

dismissal of the buyer. Such an admission about the goods can be
evidence of a lack of good faith, which is obligatory in every contract
or duty within the Code and goes both to performance and

enforcementse
In summary, many courts hold that the common law still applies
in determining the applicability of the common law exceptions to the
parol evidence rule under section 2-202, concluding that section 2-202

is determinative only when the parties have actually entered into a
legally efficacious contract.
V.

SECTION 2-202: LEGISLATIVE INTENT
AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

Inherent in the foregoing discussion is the contention that section
2-202 diverges from the common law incantations of the parol
evidence rule. But how different is it? To what extent has the common
law rule been changed?"'
78. "Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the affirmation or promise." UCC § 2-313(l)(a).
79. Id., Comment 7.
80. UCC § 1-203. See generally Summers, "Good Faith" in General ContractLaw and the
SalesProvisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. R v. 195 (1968).
81. General discussions of the changes wrought by section 2-202 on the law of individual
states may be found in Bigham, Tennessee Law andthe Sales Article of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 VAND. L. REv. 873, 881-82 (1964); Davenport, The Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code: An Introduction and Articles I and 2, 43 NED. L. REv. 671, 694-95 (1964);
McDonough. The ParolEvidence Rule in South Dakota and the Effect ofSection 2-202 of the
Uniform Commercial Code,. 10 S.D.L. REv. 60 (1965); Comment, Unsettling the SettledThe Uniform Commercial Code and the Law of Contracts, 14 KANS. L. REv. 509, 514-15
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The New York Law Revision Commission, commenting upon the
section prior to the change made in the 1957 draft, suggested that
insofar as [section 2-202] prescribes that all written memoranda or
embodiments of a contract for sale shall be deemed to be partial integrations
unless the Court affirmatively finds the writing to have been intended as a total
integration, [it] is in conflict with an established line of New York cases ....
The chief purpose of this section is apparently to "loosen up" the parol
evidence rule by abolishing the presumption that a writing (apparently
complete) is a total integration, "a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms agreed upon," and by requiring the court to make a definite finding that
the parties intended a total integration before "consistent additional terms"
(parol) are to be excluded. ....

It is apparent that section 2-202 went even further in changing the
law than the New York Law Revision Commission thought it did.
Perhaps the most interesting case in support of this proposition is one
which at first reading does not seem to involve section 2-202 at all,
since the transaction with which it was concerned probably occurred
prior to the Code's effective date. However, while never directly
mentioning section 2-202, the court invokes its substance in important
portions of its opinion, leading to the conclugion that that section did
indeed govern the result in the case. More specifically, in Ciunci v.
Wella Corp.3 the plaintiff signed the following printed agreement:
In consideration of giving me a permanent wave and/or. . . any other service
free of charge, I hereby release. . the Wella Corporation . . . from (1) any
and all liability for any damages and/or injuries resulting from. or caused by
the technicians and/or equipment, accessories, lotions, creams and/or
treatment used in connection therewith and (2) from any and all liability for
damage and/or injury sustained by me as a result of using any products
purchased by me from you which are sold by the Wella Corporation. Any
products purchased by the undersigned from you shall not be deemed to be
whole or part consideration for the foregoing release."

When plaintiffs ear was injured during the hair treatment she
brought this action against the corporation.5 During the trial the
(1966); Comment, The Mechanics of Parol Modification of Contracts Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 29 U. PITT. L. REv. 665 (1968).
The relationship of parol evidence and article 3 of the Code is discussed in Peters, Suretyshi
UnderArticle3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE LJ. 833, 848-61 (1968).
82. NEw YORK LAW REvISION COMMiSSION, supranote 66, at 598-601,
83. 26 App. Div. 2d 109,271 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1966). Other commentators have also concluded
that section 2-202 was held applicable in this case. See R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note
56, at 4-134 n.72.1.
84. 26 App. Div. 2d at 110-11, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
85. The theory of the action is not set out.
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parties stipulated that the plaintiff, if called to the stand, would testify
that at the time she signed the above agreement, an employee of the
defendant told her that the agreement was for the purpose of relieving
the defendant from responsibility for injury to her hair; they further
stipulated that defendant's manager, if called to testify, would state
that he had no knowledge of any conversation with the plaintiff
regarding the meaning or intent of the agreement.
In reversing the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of the
defendant, the appellate court stated that
the issue to be determined was whether the covenant not to sue is broad enough
to prevent recovery for injury to the ear, as well as to the hair. The parties
disagree on that. That issue cannot be determined solely on the basis of the card
signed by the plaintiff for the card does not point to the answer. Accordingly,
the intent of the parties must be ascertained from testimony. Such testimony
would be admissible, for it would not contradict the writing, but would be
evidence of a consistent additional term to the writing."

The contract in Ciunci, although harsh and one-sided, states in
rather plain and understandable terms that the defendant is not liable
for any damage or injury to the plaintiff. However, it seems clear that
the court thought it unconscionable to permit the defendant to absolve
itself from all responsibility for injury to the plaintiff just because she
received a free hair treatment. While it could have brought notions of
public policy into play, resulting in a declaration that the contract was
void,81 the court apparently thought it could compel the same result
within the framework of the parol evidence rule.
The court's rationale presents two justifications for its
circumvention of the parol evidence rule. First, "the intent of the
parties must be ascertained from testimony." The court must have
thought it possible, therefore, that the parties in this case intended to
agree to different things. Reasoning that "intent" is a factual
question and cannot be determined solely by reference to any writing,
the opinion implies that parol testimony must be received to resolve
the point.
The second aspect of the court's rationale is that evidence of intent
is admissible as evidence of a "consistent additional term."
Obviously, however, proof of an intent different from that evidenced
by the writing is proof neither of a consistent term nor of an
86. Id.at 111,271 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
87. Cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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additional term. Rather, it is proof of an inconsistent alternative
term ."
The importance of this case can be clearly demonstrated only if it

is brought into focus in a section 2-202 context. Speaking in the
plural, the section says "the parties" agree," "intended by the

parties," and "their agreement." Thus, the first requirement of this
section is that a writing, to be protected from the introduction of
parol evidence, must be the agreement of both parties. The comments
also indicate the draftsmen's desire to have the courts discover and
enforce expectations of the parties, rather than binding the parties to

an agreement which one of them may never have contemplated. Of
particular importance is Comment 3 which provides, in the context of
subparagraph b, that "consistent additional terms . . . may be
proved unless the court finds that the writing was intended by both
parties as a complete and exclusive statement of all of the terms.'",
Surely what is true with respect to the draftsmen's interpretation of

section 2-202(b), which speaks in the passive voice, is also true with
regard to section 2-202's earlier uses of the plural form in the statute
itself.9

The contract of adhesion is something with which all consumers
and their attorneys are familiar. 91 Written by one party, the seller in
88. After all, the agreement did provide for the release of the defendant from "any and all
liability for any damages and/or injuries... " If the case were to go to trial again, and the
plaintiff were permitted to introduce evidence of her understanding of the contract, the resulting
agreement would be treated as if it had read "any and all liability for any damages and/or
injuries resulting to my hair ....
" This is hardly what the defendant contemplated, either at
the time it drafted the agreement or when it presented the agreement to the plaintiff for her
signature.
89. UCC § 2-202,Comment3.
90. But cf. Palmer, Reformation and the Parol Evidence Rule, 65 MicH. L. REv. 833
(1967):
It is debatable whether the language ["intended by the parties as a final expression of
their agredment with respect to" the terms that are in question] is meant to permit direct
contradiction of a written term which the parties did not intend to be an accurate
expression of their actual agreement. . . . If the propriety of such a contradiction was
contemplated it would have been better to provide: "intended by the parties as a final and
accurate expression etc." Id. at 835 n.8.
91. See generally Hale, Bargaining.Duress, and EconomicLiberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603
(1943); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Meyer, Contracts ofAdhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental
Breach, 50 VA. L. Rev. 1178 (1964).
In the context of the automobile sales contract, the court in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 390, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), noted that "[t]he warranty before us is a
standardized form designed for mass use. It is imposed upon the automobile consumer. He takes
it or leaves it, and he must take it to buy an automobile. No bargaining is engaged in with
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the consumer transaction, the adhesion contract is couched in highly
technical language which is often mysterious even to the well-educated
consumer; to the less-educated consumer, it may be entirely
incomprehensible. Since the buyer must sign the contract of adhesion
without any possibility of altering its terms or conditions, his only
choice is to buy under the stated conditions or not to buy at all. When
the item covered by the contract is a necessity, or at least very
important to the consumer's own view of his life-style, the consumer
has no choice at all since he is not free to adopt the latter alternative of
not buying. Finally, the consumer's problem is aggravated when every
dealer uses similar or identical forms.
The only prerequisite to the common law parol evidence rule's
most rigorous application was an intention by both parties to enter
into a contract.92 Thus, if the consumer admitted upon crossexamination that, yes, he knew he was signing a contract-albeit he
did not know what the terms were-and, yes, he intended to enter into
a contract with the seller, the parol evidence rule blocked all further
attempts to introduce parol evidence of intent. Section 2-202, on the
other hand, contemplates that no "bargain of the parties in fact," and
thus no "agreement," can exist in the absence of concrete knowledge
by the buyer regarding all the terms of the contract which he is
signing. Thus, if both parties must intend the terms of the writing to
be the final expression of their agreement in order for section 2-202 to
apply, both parties must know and understand what was in the
contract. In most situations, it is unlikely that the buyer will
understand the terms of the writing even if he could and did read
them.93 Moreover, a party cannot intend something which he doesn't
understand."4 Thus, if a seller is ever going to use section 2-202 to
respect to it." Id. at 87. The same is true in most consumer situations involving much less
expensive items than automobiles.
92. See Palmer, supranote 90, at 835:
In countless cases the extrinsic evidence has been rejected out of hand, merely on the

ground that it "varies the terms of the writing," without inquiry into whether the writing
was intended to be a complete and accurate embodiment of the agreement ...

[E]xplicitly or otherwise the court holds that the writing itself is conclusive on the issue:
an appearance of completeness is regarded as decisive.

93. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F).d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,399-400, 161 A.Id 69,92-93 (1960).
94. The importance of the parties' intentions under section 2-202 is emphasized in several
cases. See, e.g., Stern & Co. v. State Loan & Fin. Corp., 238 F. Supp. 901 (D. Del, 1965);
McDown v. Wilson,426 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. App. 1968); Holland Furniture Co. v. Heidrich, 7 Pa.
D. &C. 204 (C.P. Luzerne Co. 1955).

Vol. 1970:881]

PAROL EVIDENCE: UCC 2-202

protect his contract of adhesion, he has an affirmative duty in many

circumstances to explain the provisions of the writing.
One of the most difficult and common problems for the

consumer's attorney is that of warranties. Are disclaimer or
limitation of warranty clauses in the contract of adhesion enforceable
against the consumer? The following discussion will examine the

seller's affirmative duty to explain the terms of the contract within
this context.
In Hunt v. Perkins Machinery .Co.18 the contract disclaimed all
warranties including the warranties of merchantability and fitness.

The disclaimer, appearing third in a list of terms and conditions, was
in bold face capitals on the back of the order form. On the face of the
order, also in bold face capitals, was the statement: "BOTH THIS
ORDER AND ITS ACCEPTANCE ARE SUBJECT TO 'TERMS
AND CONDITIONS' STATED IN THIS ORDER." The plaintiff,

suing for breach of implied warranties of merchantability and of
fitness for a particular purpose, was awarded a judgment in the trial

court.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the
judgment on the basis of section 2-316(2) of the Code, which provides

that exclusions of warranties of merchantability-if in writing-and
fitness-which "must [always] be by a writing"-must be
"conspicuous.""5 The court stated that
the provisions on the front of the purchase order did not make adequate
reference to the provisions on the back of the order to draw attention to the
latter. Hence, the provision on the back of the order cannot be said to be
conspicuous although printed in an adequate size and style of type. The
disclaimer was not effective.Y

This case shows the importance of section 2-316(2) as a specific tool
to allow proof of parol warranties of merchantability and fitness." It
is, however, far more important for its more general implications.
95. 352 Mass. 535,226 N.E.2d 228 (1967).
96. UCC § 2-316(2).
97. 352 Mass. at 541, 226 N.E.2d at 232.
98. Another available technique in such a situation is a declaration that the provisions in
question are unconscionable. See UCC § 2-302. In terms generally applicable to the consumer
transaction under consideration, Judge Skelly Wright has stated:
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party. . . . In many cases the meaningfulness of the
choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. The manner in which the
contract was entered is also relevant to this consideration. Did each party to the contract,
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The first Comment to section 2-316 suggests the rationale for the
requirement of "conspicuousness":
[This section] seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained
language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when inconsistent
with language of express warranty and permitting the exclusion of implied
warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances which protect
the buyer from surprise."

What is at the heart of this protection of the buyer from surprise? It is
submitted that this provision reflects the emphasis on intent which is
inherent in the Code's concept of the "bargain": if the
"conspicuous" disclaimer has come to the attention of the buyer, and
it remains in the contract, there is a strong presumption that it was
bargained for and that both parties intended that it be a part of the
contract. But in the normal course of things, how often will this be the
case?1 00
The operation of the parol evidence rule in this specific context
was seen very clearly by the court in Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v.
Home Gas Industries, Inc. 01 Following representations by the

defendant's salesman that the defendant's air conditioners "were well
constructed and would perform the work of cooling the rooms of the
hotel," the plaintiff entered into an oral contract for the purchase of
considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to
understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of
fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices? .. .In such a case the usual rule
that the terms of the agreement should not be questioned should be abandoned and the
court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement
should be withheld. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
See generally Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 485, 521-22 (1967); Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31
U. Prrr. L. REv. 359 (1970).
99. UCC § 2-316, Comment 1 (emphasis added). "Section 2-316, then, not only says that
warranties may be disclaimed, but it says how one should go about doing so, in rather
impressive detail and with surprising particularity. It is obvious that the vice is 'surprise,' and
thus even the word 'conspicuous' at the very heart of the provision is not left to speculation."
Leff, supra note 98, at 521-22.
100. The tug of war between warranties and the parol evidence rule is not new. One
commentator has noted: "As legal devices to promote fair and easy commercial intercourse,
warranties on the one hand and disclaimers and the Parol Evidence Rule on the other pull in
opposite directions, and to the extent that the latter are improperly extended, the effective
utilization of warranties is unjustifiably diminished." Note, Warranties,Disclaimers and the
Parol Evidence Rule, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 858, 859 (1953). Thus, the parol evidence rule has
often caused injustice under the guise of imparting certainty and stability to commercial
transactions. Cf id.
101. 68 Ill. App. 2d 297,216 N.E.2d 282 (1966).
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hotel room air conditioners from defendant. When the air

conditioners did not work, plaintiff filed suit against both defendantseller and the manufacturer. The manufacturer pointed out, by way of

defense, that it gave an express warranty which specifically negated
recovery for any special, indirect, or consequential damages. After

noting that the disclaimer came when the machines were delivered,
well after the contract had been entered into and too late to become

part of the contract, the court continued:
Even if the oral contract did contain -some reference to a warranty, it is
extremely doubtful that the buyer would be bound by the disclaimer of
warranty unless he had specifically been made aware that such a disclaimer
existed as part of this warranty. As was said in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, supra, in the absence of fraud, one who entered into a contract without
making himself fully aware of its import cannot later relieve himself of the
consequences. That case, however, held that where a written contract held a
disclaimer of warranties, and such a disclaimer had not been called to the
attention of the buyer, the buyer could not be bound. The fact that in that case
the contract was written while in the case at bar it was oral, would make no
difference.
In short, when one purchases a product, he has a right to assume that it will
be fit for normal use. A seller or manufacturer cannot disclaim its
responsibility for the product unless the buyer is made fully aware that he takes
the product subject to such conditions.1'2

The case capsulizes the conclusion above that the disclaimer clause
°3
should be held to be nonexistent in almost every consumer case.1

The Comment to section 1-201(10)114 says in part that "the test
[for determining conspicuousness] is whether attention can
reasonably be expected to be called to [a term]."'1 Given this test, the
quality of conspicuousness is not merely a question of the size and

color of the type, although these are the only examples given in the
statute itself; rather, the statute only indicates "some of the methods
102. Id. at 306, 216 N.E.2d at 286-87. While Henningsen was decided on pre-Code grounds,
the court thought that its opinion was "in keeping with" section 2-316. Id. at 306,216 N.E.2d at
286.
103. See also Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House,
59 Misc. 2d 226,298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. County Ct. 1969), discussed at note 128 infra.
104.- UCC § 1-201(10). The section provides that "[a] term or clause is conspicuous when it
is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed
it.. . . Language in the body of a form is 'conspicuous' if it is in larger or other contrasting
type or color. . . .Whether a term or clause is 'conspicuous' or not is for decision by the court.'
Id.
105. UCC § 1-201(10), Comment 10.
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of making a term attention-calling." ' " Thus, conspicuousness must
be a question of negotiation or bargaining. The buyer must be given
the opportunity to become aware of the terms of the contract.
One-but not the only-method of accomplishing this is by forcing
the seller to present the more oppressive terms in such a way that the
buyer's attention will be drawn to them, achieving the necessary
"'notice."
This requirement of notice is emphasized by the language in
section 1-201(10) which provides that a term is conspicuous "when it
is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate
ought to have noticed it." In attempting to characterize "notice,"
section 1-201(25) provides that a person has "notice" of a fact when
he has actual knowledge of it, when he has received a notice or
notification of the fact, or when he has reason, from all the facts and
circumstances known to him at the time in question, to know that the
fact exists.10 7
Section 1-201(26) adds that
a person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or notification to another by taking
such steps as may reasonably be required to inform the other in ordinary course
whether or not such other actually comes to know of it. A person "receives" a
notice or notification when
(a) it comes to his attention ....
10

Even though the definition of "conspicuous" in section 1-201(10)
refers to "written" terms or clauses, it is clear from the use of the
word "notice" in the definition and from the comment to the section
that the problem of conspicuousness is really a function of notice, not
merely form; this in turn, as earlier stated, is a question of intent and
bargain. Taking the definitional components of sections 1-201(25)
and (26) in the consumer context, the following conclusions emerge:
unless the presence of a disclaimer clause is specifically brought to
their attention prior to the signing of the contract, few-if
any-consumers would ever have "actual knowledge"'"' of the fact
that the contract contains a disclaimer of warranties, much less of
what it means; since the seller who slips one over on the consumer has
106. Id.
107. UCC § 1-201(25).
108. UCC § 1-201(26). The somewhat circular nature of the Code provisions and definitions
concerning "notice" is demonstrated and criticized in Mellinkoff, The Language of the
Uniform CommercialCode, 77 YALe LJ. 185, 20003 (1967).
109. UCC § 1-201(25)(a).
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not taken "such steps as may be reasonably required to inform [the
consumer] in ordinary course,"" 0 the consumer has not "received a
notice or notification of" the fact of the presence of the disclaimer;"'
and it would appear quite difficult to argue, as the seller would in the
ordinary consumer transaction, that "from all the facts and
circumstances known to [the consumer] at the time in question [the
consumer] has reason to know" that the fact of the disclaimer
exists."' Steps which are reasonably adequate to give notice in one
case may be insufficient in another situation. When the seller's
ordinary course of business involves a clientele for whom the written
word is not an ordinary means of communication beyond that which
is necessary for daily existence, the steps which are "reasonably
required to inform" are more than red ink and boldface type. The
reasonable steps in such cases must in fact be verbal explanations of
the contract terms. Indeed, it is very easy to conclude that the
situations in which the purchaser understands fully the implications of
what he is signing are so infrequent that an affirmative obligation
should be uniformly imposed upon the seller to offer a detailed and
understandable explanation of the more rigorous terms of the
contract." 3
Not unknown at the common law, this "read-it-aloud" concept is
best illustrated by a surprisingly hoary case"' involving the sale of a
farm machine. In making the sale, the seller's agent told the illiterate
defendant that the paper he was signing-a printed purchase
order-was simply a paper which would enable him to get the
machine, deliberately withholding information of its contents. One of
its provisions required .that the buyer would have to follow certain
procedures in order to take advantage of the warranties contained
therein. When the seller brought suit on two promissory notes given to
evidence the purchase price, the buyer raised a defense and
counterclaim based on an alleged breach of warranty. The court
found that the "suppression of material facts" and the "withholding
of material information" was fraud, holding in favor of the defendant
11 5
on both his defense and his counterclaim.
110. UCC § 1-201(26).

111. UCC § 1-201(25)(b).
112. UCC § 1-201 (25)(c).
113. See the language of Williams v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo. appearing in note 98

supra.
114. Parsons Band Cutter & Self-Feeder Co. v. Haub, 83 Minn. 180,86 N.W. 14 (1901).

115. While a cynic might distinguish this case as a "buyer-couldn't-read-case" not
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In another more recent case," a seller brought suit against his
buyer for nonpayment on a contract which provided that "our
guarantee of quality does not extend beyond taking goods back at
invoice price if claim is made within ninety days from date of
shipment." In holding this provision ineffective to accomplish its
intended purpose the court stated:
Both the president and vice-president and treasurer of [the buyer] testified that
they had not previously observed such stipulation and it was never called to
their attention. It is so located as to easily escape attention. Certainly it could
not be said as a matter of law that [the buyer] should have been aware of the
stipulation. "The rule in this state is that for such a clause to be applicable in
any case it must be shown that it was brought to the attention of the
7

purchaser.""

Other cases, some under the Uniform Commercial Code, lead to the
same conclusion." 8
In summary, combination of sections 2-202 and 2-316 with the
notice provisions of the Code requires that disclaimer of warranty
provisions be specifically brought to the attention of the consumerpurchaser. If this means that they must be read out loud and perhaps
even explained, then so be it.
VI.

PAROL EVIDENCE AND EXPREss WARRANTIES

Thus far our discussion has been primarily limited to implied
warranties. But what of express warranties?"' In dealing with this
problem it will be useful to set forth a common hypothetical situation.
The consumer has signed a 'orm contract for the purchase of a
television set after oral statements by the seller that the merchandise is
guaranteed to be new and that it will receive all the UHF channels in
applicable to the typical "literate" consumer, one may wonder whether anyone, able to read or
not, is functionally literate when it comes to reading and comprehending the run-of-the-mill
warranty disclaimer clause.
116. Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84,48 S.E.2d 653 (1948).
117. Id.at 97, 48 S.E.2d at 659.
118. See. e.g., Smith v.Regina Mfg. Corp., 396 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1968); Mack Trucks, Inc.
v. Jet Asphalt a Rock Co., 246 Ark. 99,437 S.W.2d 459 (1969); Cherokee Inv. Co. v. Voiles,
166 Colo. 270,443 P2d 727, 729 (1968); Dailey v. Holiday Distrib. Corp., 260 Iowa 859, 151
N.W.2d 477,485 (1967); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441,447,240 A2d
195, 198-99 (1968). For a discussion of similar earlier cases, see Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,392-99, 161 A.2d 69,87-90 (1960).
119. As used in this context "warranty" means a "promise that something will happen in the
future, usually without the necessity of further performance by the promisor." Sweet, supra note
70, at 881 n.17. For a discussion of the application of this definition to a typical consumer
transaction, see id.
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the vicinity. The contract contains both a disclaimer of all warranties,
express or implied, and an integration clause. Although the set turns
out to be capable only of receiving the VHF channels, the seller

refuses to "make good" on his warranty. May the buyer, either in an
action brought by him for breach of contract, or by way of defense to

an action by the seller for default in the installment payments,
introduce evidence of the seller's statements?
Section 2-313 provides in part:
(I)

Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. 12

The comments to this section indicate beyond peradventure that the

draftsmen intended that the parol evidence rule should be used
infrequently to exclude parol evidence of express warranties made by
the seller during the negotiations leading up to the sale. 22 The same is

true of integration clauses: "'Express' warranties rest on 'dickered'
aspects of the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of

that bargain that words of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the
basic dickered terms."'2 Further, "any fact which is to take such

affirmations [of fact], once made, out of the agreement requires clear
affirmative proof."

123

Comment 4 sets out the essence of the

draftsmen's purpose with specificity:
In view of the principle that the whole purpose of the law of warranty is to
determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell, the policy is
adopted of those cases which refuse except in unusual circumstances to
120. UCC § 2-313.
121. "The precise time when words of description or affirmation are made . . . is not
material. The sole question is whether the language. . . [is] fairly to be regarded as part of the
contract.' Id., Comment 7.
122. Id., Comment I.
123. Id., Comment 3.
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recognize a material deletion of the seller's obligation. . . . A clause generally
disclaiming "all warranties, express or implied" cannot reduce the seller's
obligation with respect to such description and therefore cannot be given literal
effect under Section 2-316.12

Finally, if the warranty was a part of the bargain to which the buyer
thought he was agreeing when he signed the contract, it remains part
of the contract. 125 Thus, we return to the original question: does
section 2-202 preclude proof of the parol warranty made by the seller

in the hypothetical above? More specifically, does the inclusion of an
integration clause have the effect of invoking that part of section 21
316(l) which refers to section 2-202? 26

Given the somewhat obscure draftsmanship and the generally
unarticulated relationship between sections 2-202 and 2-316, 12 the
124. Id., Comment 4; accord,Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 102 n.8,54 Cal.
Rptr. 609, 619-20 n.8 (1966).
125. What statements of the seller have in the circumstances and in objective judgment
become part of the basis of the bargain?. . . [A]ll of the statements of the seller do so
unless good reason is shown to the contrary. . . . Even as to false statements of value,
however, the possibility is left open that a remedy may be provided by the law relating to
fraud or misrepresentation. UCC § 2-313, Comment 8.
126. Section 2-316(1) provides:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as
consistent with each other, but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or
extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that
such construction is unreasonable. UCC § 2-316(1) (emphasis added).
127. The worrisome nature of the draftsmanship is best articulated in R. DuEsENBERG &L.
KING, supra note 56, § 6.06, at 6-13 to 6-15. Acknowledging that the answer "is not
entirely free from doubt," the authors indicate that the parol evidence rule may not exclude
testimony relating to the alleged oral warranty: "The parol evidence rule would seem to exclude
the warranty, but the warranty provisions of Section 2-316(1) would seem to have the policy of
including the warranty." Id. at 6-13. In the situation where the oral warranty and the language
in the written contract cannot reasonably be construed together, the authors note that section 2202
would seem to say that if the writing is intended to give the final expression of the intent
or contract of the parties, then no evidence of prior or contemporaneous terms may be
admissible. Of course, it would always be left open for a court to find that the writing
itself was not intended as the final expression of the parties. This finding could be based
solely on the fact of the existence of the prior oral express warranty. This would seem like
circular reasoning by finding that the express oral warranty made the written contract
not conclusive, final or complete and, therefore, permitting the express oral warranty to
be admissible in evidence. Yet this is the result that seems intended by the Code, or, at
least, if not intended one that is left open to a court to achieve. Id. at 6-14.
On the other hand, they conclude that a properly drafted disclaimer of warranty would preclude
the introduction of parol evidence. Id. at 7-36 to 7-37. Finally, they note the particular
relative disadvantage of the buyer in connection with a disclaimer clause in the typical consumer
transaction: first, inclusion of such a clause does little to endanger the sellers' public relations
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courts' trouble with this problem is not surprising. As in so many
other areas of contract law, however, the courts have either tried to
present some coherent rationale for a decision in favor of the
consumer, or they have begun to indulge in the type of fiction

frequently appearing in the law.
In declining to give effectiveness to language of disclaimer, the
courts have found either that the oral express warranty was part of the
bargain of the parties or, conversely, that the disclaimer clause was
not part of the bargain. These.twin conclusions lead to the

admissibility of parol evidence:
The [disclaimer] clause . . . does not modify or exclude . . . any express

warranties, if any were made to defendant by the plaintiff during the course of
the negotiations leading to the contract. Whether such express warranties were
made, . . .or modified by or excluded by the actions of the parties prior to the
contract (U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b),(c)) are matters of fact as to which the parol
evidence rule .. . may not be applicable . . . by reason of the legal
nonexistence of the disclaimer clause.1 2

The desire of the courts to give effect to the first comment to
section 2-316, thereby preserving both parties' "bargained"
expectations, 12' is also clear from the opinion in Walcott &Steele, Inc.
v. Carpenter."0 In that case, each bag of cotton seeds which the

plaintiff purchased from defendant had an attached tag showing
germination to be eighty percent. Yet the wording at the bottom of the
invoice sent to plaintiff stated:
NON-WARRANTY. [Defendants] Give no Warranty, Express or Implied.
As to Description, Productiveness, or Any Other Matter of Any Seeds That
"because it is doubted that the language will be fully understood by the consumer," from the
commercial standpoint, the inclusion of such a clause will pose no real problem, because it will
"go unnoticed or will be deemphasized by the buyer [seller?]; or. . .[t]he clause will be in
general use among sellers and the buyer will have no real place to turn." Id. at 7-37. This same
kind of "logic" has led the courts to view form contracts and disclaimers more critically and,
hopefully, will lead them to further expand the universe of evidence not subject to exclusion
under section 2-202. See also Duesenberg, The Manufacturer'sLast Stand: The Disclaimer,20
Bus. LAW. 159 (1964), where the author noted that the disclaimer-although justified on
a risk-control basis-is frequently used deceptively as a method of risk elimination. Id. at 162.
128. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc. 2d
226, 231,298 N.Y.S.2d 292,298, (N.Y. County Ct. 1969). Cf. Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the CaliforniaLaw ofSales Warranties,8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 281 (1961).
"[E]xpress oral warranties not inconsistent with any written term will become admissible
against the reneging seller unless the trial court finds the document was intended to be an
exhaustive statement of the entire agreement." Id. at 312.
129. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
130. 246 Ark. - 436 S.W.2d 820 (1969).
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We Sell and We Will Not in any Way Be Responsible for the Crop. Our
Liability in all Instances Is Limited to the Purchase Price of the Seed.' 3'

When the seed only germinated at twenty-seven percent, the plaintiff-

buyer brought this suit against the seller. Concluding first that, as a
matter of law, the tag attached to each bag created an express
warranty that the seed would germinate at eighty percent, the court
went on to hold that the disclaimer was "unbargained for" and
therefore not a part of the contract between the parties. This led

inevitably to the conclusion that the negation of the express warranty
was inoperative, since the disclaimer and the express warranty could
not reasonably be construed as consistent."'
Taken in conjunction with Luther Williams, Jr., Inc. v.

Johnson,'3 these cases clearly establish that neither a disclaimer of
warranties nor an integration clause will prevent the introduction of
parol evidence of warranties made during the course of negotiations., U
This conclurion, the courts reason, must naturally follow from the
emphasis of the Code's sections and comments upon the bargain and
the knowledge of the parties.13 That is, section 2-202 forbids evidence
of prior or contemporaneous agreements only if the parties intend the
writing to be a final expression of their agreement. Since intent is a
question of fact which cannot be discovered by looking at the writing
alone, an allegation by the buyer that he did not intend the writing to

be the total integration of the agreement or that the disclaimer or
131. Id. at ._,436S.W.2d at 822.
132. Id. at _ 436 S.W.2d at 823 (interpreting UCC § 2-316(1)). Cf. Berk v. Gordon
Johnson Co., 232 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
133. 229 A.2d 163 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967). A discussion of the case appears in the text accompanying notes 59-65 supra.
134. But cf. Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp, 241 Ark. 62,406 S.W.2d 142 (1966); First Nat'l
Bank v. Husted, 57 IlL. App. 2d 227,205 N.E.2d 780 (1965).
135. The courts are starting to use other techniques in order to reach the same result. For
example, in Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1969), an action for personal injuries suffered as a result of an accident caused by an allegedly
defective car, the court held that "the contractual provisions pleaded here disclaim all
warranties, and at the same time would limit the remedies available for a breach of warranty,
and attempts to do both create an ambiguity and are unreasonable if that is what was intended
under the contract and the defense as pleaded .
I...
Id. at 243, 298 N.Y.S. at 540. Compare
Leveridge v. Notaras, 433 P.2d 935 (Okla. 1967). This thought is apparent in Note, Warranties,
Disclaimersand the ParolEvidence Rule, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 858 (1953):
Since the Code's proposals are aptly designed to preclude misapplication of the Parol
Evidence Rule and to prevent enforcement of disclaimers which the buyer had no intent
to make, adoption of the Code will revitalize the commercial utility of warranties. The
effect of bargaining inequality will be lessened, honesty of the market will be enhanced,
and the bargain to which ie parties have agreed will be enforced. Id. at 871.
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integration clause was inserted by the seller to serve his own interest
should serve to circumvent the prohibitions contained in sections 2316(1) and 2-202. The facts and circumstances which must be
examined to determine intent should include the relative bargaining
strength of the parties and the social, economic, and educational
background of the buyer.
Once it has been determined that the buyer did not intend to
accept the disclaimer clause as part of the "bargain," only the
conflict between the oral warranty and the written disclaimer of
warranties in the contract remains for resolution. In resolving this
issue the courts have been quick to find that the exclusion of
warranties clause was not part of the agreement-was not intended by
the buyer-and is therefore not protected from contradiction by parol
testimony. Then the oral warranty itself must be proved in the usual
manner to the satisfaction of the trier of fact.
This analysis finds further support in Comment 2 to section 2-316,
which states that "[t]he seller is protected under this Article against
false allegations of oral warranties by its provisions on parol and
extrinsic evidence."'3 6 Apparently convinced that the seller received
adequate protection against false allegations by section 2-202, the
draftsmen gave him no further protection in section 2-316(1); rather,
they appear to have "incorporated" the provisions of section 2-202
into section 2-316(1), this time with specific reference to oral express
warranties. The conflict between an alleged express warranty and a
disclaimer thereof in the written contract is to bejudged by section 2202 standards.
The attitude of the Code's draftsmen toward express warranties is
portrayed in Comment 1 to section 2-313: express warranties go to the
"essence" of the bargain; disclaimers are "repugnant" to "basic
dickered terms."' 13 7 Apparently convinced that express warranties are
the only bargaining advantage some buyers have, the draftsmen seek
to prevent the seller from routinely disregarding his express warranties
through a boilerplate disclaimer in his sale form.'3
Only with all this in mind may the reference to section 2-202
contained in section 2-316(1) be construed. Does the subjection of
express parol warranties to scrutiny under section 2-202 mean that no
136. UCC § 2-316, Comment 2 (making cross reference to section 2-202).

137. UCC § 2-313, Comment 1.
138. Cf. UCC § 2-313, Comment 4, which contends that "the probability is small that a
real price is intended to be exchanged for a pseudo-obligation."
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oral warranty may ever be proved if it is contrary to a written
"contractual" negation or limitation of warranties? If the answer to
that question were yes, Comment 2 to section 2-316 would not imply
that there are cases in which oral warranties could be proved; by
limiting the function of section 2-202 to protecting sellers against
"false allegations of oral warranties," the draftsmen implicitly
recognize that section 2-202 will not protect sellers from "true"
allegations of oral warranties. If the disclaimer was not "intended"
by both parties, the allegation of oral warranty may be true, and
section 2-202 will not protect the seller. This conclusion is in all
respects consistent with the draftsmen's belief that express warranties
often form an integral part of the bargain of the parties. Realism will
prevail over boilerplate.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This article has sought to show that the Uniform Commercial
Code's parol evidence rule is substantially different from its common
law predecessor. While the common law rule operated to the distinct
disadvantage of the consumer and was an essential ingredient in the
campaign of some sellers to bilk their buyers, the rule's operation
under the Code is not so one-sided. In fact, section 2-202 should
operate affirmatively to permit the consumer to introduce evidence of
oral warranties and promises made during the course of negotiations
leading up to his purchase, thereby equalizing the bargaining power of
seller and consumer. Recognizing that the parol evidence rule has
often been used to create injustice rather than to prevent it, the courts
should honor the attempt by draftsmen of the Code to turn the
situation around and provide a rule which operates fairly for buyer
and seller alike.

